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ABSTRACT. The nature of legislative intent remains a subject of vigorous debate.
Its many participants perceive the intent in different ways. In this paper, I identify
the reason for such diverse perceptions: three intentions are involved in law-
making, not one. The three intentions correspond to the three aspects of a speech
act: locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary. The dominant approach in legal
theory holds that legislative intent is a semantic (locutionary) one. A closer
examination shows that it is, in fact, an illocutionary one. In the paper, I draw the
consequences for legal interpretation of this more theorized model of legislative
intent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal philosophers have argued about the nature of legislative intent
since time immemorial. What is striking is that they understand
intent in different ways: as a particular way in which legal text should
be understood, as a will to enact a text as law or as a set of expec-
tations regarding the law’s future consequences. This diversity cau-
ses a number of misunderstandings and conflations.
In this article, I explain why legal philosophy perceives the leg-
islative intent in such a diversified way: In the course of lawmaking
three kinds of intention occur, not one. The distinction of three kinds
of intention derives from J.L. Austin’s construction of a speech act,1
which he broke into three constituent parts: a locutionary act, an
illocutionary act, and a perlocutionary act. Like the three aspects of a
speech act, the three kinds of intentions I discuss (locutionary, illo-
1 John L. Austin, How to do Things with Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975).
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cutionary and perlocutionary) differ in nature and function. Failure
to acknowledge the distinctiveness of these intentions has caused
considerable practical and theoretical problems in the ongoing de-
bate on legislative intent.
The first section of this article demonstrates that, to date, dis-
cussions on legislative intent generally have not considered the
variety of intentions involved in the lawmaking process; this has led
to confusing an intention to say something with an intention to
enact a law or to bring about specific effects in reality.2 The second
part of this article presents the idea of three intentions and
demonstrates that their differentiation is particularly important in
written communication, especially where (as in lawmaking) one
person drafts a text, and another person uses this text to perform a
speech act. The last section of the article presents the argument that
distinguishing between three kinds of legislative intentions and
attributing these to different legislating actors could resolve a
number of important theoretical issues. These issues include that of
the existence of a collective intention and the question about the
need to take the lawmaker’s communicative intention into account
in the interpretation of law.
II. TRADITIONAL PERSPECTIVE: A VARIETY OF INTENTIONS
Three approaches to legislative intent prevail in legal theory. The
first and most popular approach regards legislative intent as a
semantic intention.3 In this perspective, legislative intent is an
intention to say something, to communicate a specific semantic
content to addressees. Legislative intent in this approach is the
intention of a lawmaker as a speaker. The lawmaker uses language
2 The distinction of locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary intentions exists in legal philo-
sophical literature (see Heidi Hurd, ‘Sovereignty in Silence’, in 99 Yale Law Journal [1990], p. 945, and
Michael S. Moore, ‘A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation’, 58 Southern California Law Review 277,
1985). However, those authors have not drawn far-reaching conclusions concerning legislative intent
from that distinction.
3 Richard Ekins, The Nature of Legislative Intent (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Lawrence
M. Solan, ‘Private language, public laws. The Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Inter-
pretation’, 93 The Georgetown Law Journal (2005), p. 427. To avoid confusion, I will refer to semantic
intention rather than communicative intention as the latter has been used in the literature to refer to
both locutionary and illocutionary intentions.
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to express rules, and this intention is a factor that gives meaning to
those rules.4
The second approach understands legislative intent as the inten-
tion of the lawmaker to pass into law a text which is presented for
approval, as illustrated by Raz’s ‘minimum intention’5 or the ‘in-
tention to make law’.6 A similar approach to legislative intent can be
found in Waldron,7 who perceives legislative intent as a formal
intention to enact a text as law. The public choice theory8 also
approaches legislative intent in this way – as a will to accept a
particular legislative proposal as law. In this approach, the way the
legislative actors understand legal text is of secondary importance.
What is crucial is the decision to treat a particular text as binding.
This decision is expressed by way of a majority decision to vote for
the text and convert it into law. As the first type of intention gives
the words their meanings, the second gives them force.
In the third approach, legislative intent is equated with specific
expectations as to the results that the law will bring about in reality.9
This kind of intention exceeds the moment of lawmaking and
reaches into the future: it is about the changes in the real world that
will be caused as an effect of enacted rules. This third approach
assumes that law is an effective tool for influencing human behavior
and that the changed behavior will impact reality: crime will decline,
justice will prevail, some stakeholders will benefit, others will lose
out. Here, the legislative intent is not about what the lawmaker says
or enacts but rather about the results he or she will achieve as a
result of saying or enacting.
In this paper, I treat lawmaking as a speech act. The three ways of
perceiving legislative intent outlined above correspond to the three
kinds of intention involved in a speech act: locutionary, illocutionary
and perlocutionary. I elaborate on this triad in the next section.
4 Stanley Fish, ‘Intention Is All There Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak’s Purposive Inter-
pretation in Law’, 29 Cardozo Law Review (2008).
5 Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason:
On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries, (Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2009b), p. 284.
6 Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason:
Intention in Interpretation (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009a), p. 329.
7 Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, (Oxford, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1999).
8 Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a ‘They’, not an ‘It’: Legislative intent as oxymoron, in Inter-
national Review of Law and Economics 12(2) (1992), pp. 239–256.
9 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986, p. 321).
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III. THREE ASPECTS OF A SPEECH ACT AND THE RELATED INTENTIONS
The Speech Act Theory is a popular theoretical tool used by
philosophers of law to analyze the language of law and all related
issues, in particular lawmaking and interpreting. Many philosophers
of law directly express their conviction about the utility of this
theory10; even more of them use elements of the Speech Act Theory
in their works.11
The key element of Speech Act Theory used in the philosophy of
law is the concept of a speech act proposed by J.L. Austin,12 and
subsequently developed by other philosophers of language (Searle,13
Bach and Harnish,14 M. Sbisà,15 etc.). In the original Austinian ver-
sion,16 a speech act was presented as consisting of three sub-acts
(aspects): a locutionary act, an illocutionary act, and a perlocutionary
act. According to Austin, a locutionary act consists of uttering
something with a sense and reference (e.g. ‘open the window’). An
illocutionary act means performing an act in saying something: the
act takes place when there is a ‘conventional procedure’ which fixes
the behavior and circumstances that must obtain for the speaker to
bring about the conventional effect associated with the procedure,
namely the performance of a specific act (e.g. issuing a request or an
order to open the window). A perlocutionary act consists of a change
in the extra-linguistic reality (e.g. a window being opened).
The three aspects of a speech act differentiated by Austin corre-
spond to three kinds of intention of the person performing such an
act. The first type is a ‘locutionary (semantic) intention’: an intention
to utter the words with ‘a certain more of less definite ‘sense’ and a
10 Paul Amselek, ‘Philosophy of Law and the Theory of Speech Acts’, in Ratio Juris 1(3) (1988), pp.
187–223.
11 See Andrei Marmor, The Language of Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014; Richard Ekins,
The Nature of Legislative Intent (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Lawrence B. Solum, ‘Se-
mantic Originalism’, Illinois Public Law and Legal Theory Research Papers Series, No. 07-24, 2008.
12 Austin 1975, passim.
13 John Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge, 1969).
14 Kent Bach, Robert M. Harnish, Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts (MIT Press, 1979).
15 Marina Sbisà, Speech acts in context, Language & Communication 22 (2002), pp. 421–436.
16 A recent reconstruction of it can be found in Sbisà 2013 (Locution, Illocution, Perlocution, in Sbisà
and Turner eds., Pragmatics of Speech Actions, Mouton de Gruyter).
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more of less definite ‘reference’ (which together are equivalent of
meaning)’.17
The second type is an ‘illocutionary intention’, i.e. the intention
to perform a specific illocutionary act by uttering words (e.g. an
intention to issue an order) or, as Forguson puts it a ‘force-inten-
tion’.18 In some kinds of illocutionary acts the illocutionary intention
is ‘an intent to enact a rule’.19
The third type is a ‘perlocutionary intention’, which is the
intention to make certain changes in the extra-linguistic reality by
performing the illocutionary act.20 The perlocutionary intention is
understood as ‘the intention that the utterance produce a certain
response r in the audience (e.g., a belief, if the utterance belongs to
the assertive type, and action, or an intention to act, if the utterance
belongs to the directive type)’.21
In the majority of situations of performing speech acts, all three
kinds of intentions co-occur. Let us take as an example situation that
of two people about to exchange marriage vows. If they sincerely
take the marriage vows they perform the speech act with the
intention to utter the words of the vow (the locutionary intention),
the intention to get married (the illocutionary intention), and the
intention to live the rest of their lives together according to a pre-
scribed code of behavior (the perlocutionary intention). Indeed, in
this case the co-occurrence and coherence of the three intentions is
the condition for a valid and non-defective performance of the illo-
cutionary act.
However, there are situations the coincidence and coherence of
all three intentions does not occur in speech acts. For example, when
on stage two actors play a marriage scene, their intentions
17 Austin (1975, p. 93). As the locutionary act can be divided into three subacts (phonetic, phatic and
rhetic acts), so the locutionary intention can have three aspects. One can distinguish within it a phonetic
intention, ‘an intention to make sounds, marks or gesture’ (Joshua Rust, John Searle [London-New
York: Continuum, 2009, p. 112]), a phatic intention, called by Forguson (Lynd. W. Forguson, ‘Locu-
tionary and Illocutionary Acts’, in Berlin I., Pears D.F., Searle J.R., Forguson L.W., Pitcher G., Strawson
P.F. & Warnock G.J. [1973], Essays on J.L. Austin (Clarendon, 1973) an ‘L-intention’ and a rhetic
intention, called by Forguson an ‘SR-intention’, when SR stand for sense and reference.
18 Forguson (1973, p. 168).
19 See Mary Kate McGowan, ‘On Pragmatics, Exercitive Speech Acts and Pornography’, in Lodz
Papers in Pragmatics, 5.1 Special Issue on Speech Action (2009), pp. 133–155.
20 The distinction of illocutionary and locutionary intentions appears in Quentin Skinner, ‘Motives,
intentions, and the interpretation of texts’, New Literary History 3(2) (1972), pp. 393–408. The per-
locutionary intention is distinguished in Francois Recanati, Meaning and Force: The Pragmatics of
Performative Utterances (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 179.
21 Recanati (1987, p. 179).
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undoubtedly include the locutionary intention to say the words ‘I
take you as my husband/wife’. But the actors do not act with the
illocutionary intention to get married, nor do they have perlocu-
tionary intentions related to the reality of being married. Another
example of the absence of the perlocutionary intention arises in the
context of marriage as regulated by the Code of Canon
Law.22 According to that code, a valid marriage must consist of
several important properties or elements: unity, indissolubility,
procreation and education of offspring. If either or both of the
prospective spouses preclude any of those elements, the act of
marriage can be annulled. In this situation, despite the presence of
the illocutionary intention to get married, the absence of the per-
locutionary intention to bring about the effects related to the illo-
cutionary act (e.g. to have children) leads, according to Canon Law,
to a flaw in the act of marriage.23
The differentiation between the three intentions may be used
more broadly than in the discussion on the validity of legal acts: It
can also be used to describe more precisely the lawmaking process,
which is often understood as a complex speech act.24 Let us see how
the three intentions operate within this process.
IV. THE WRITTEN CHARACTER OF LAW; DISSONANCE BETWEEN THE
THREE INTENTIONS
In the case of illocutionary acts performed in law, the three kinds of
intention are often in perfect alignment. A police officer who says
‘Stop!’ acts with the intention to say it (the locutionary intention),
which means that he does not say it inadvertently or in error. He is
also acting with the illocutionary intention to give an order to stop
to the person he is addressing, and he wants that person to stop (the
22 See Canon 1101: 1.The internal consent of the mind is presumed to conform to the words and
signs used in celebrating the marriage. 2. If, however, either or both of the parties by a positive act of
the will exclude marriage itself, some essential element of marriage, or some essential property of
marriage, the party contracts invalidly.
23 Examples of considering perlocutionary intention as relevant for the assessment of the validity of
a legal speech act can also be found beyond the narrow scope of Canon Law. See, for instance, the
Palmer v. Thompson case [403 U.S. 217 (1971)], in which judges considered the issue of the illicit
legislative motive (which de facto is a form of illicit perlocutionary intention) of a city authority to act in
defiance of a court order relating to racial integration.
24 See Marmor (2014) and Dick W. Ruiter, ‘Institutional Legal Facts: Legal Powers and Their Effects’
(Springer Science + Business Media Dordrecht, 1993).
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perlocutionary intention). The nature of the alignment changes,
however, when we move from spoken to written communication.
Written communication is the main vehicle of more complex illocu-
tionary acts, such as passing a new law. As I indicated in another paper
(Matczak 2015), the performance of speech acts in writing makes it pos-
sible to differentiate points in time in which the locutionary intention is
formulated, and times when the two other kinds of intentions are for-
mulated. This situation was described by Bianchi25 in an example where a
person writes a ‘Don’t leave me!’ note in his office, and subsequently uses
it with respect to three different people – his wife, his son and his butler. In
each case of using the previously written note, this person formulates a
different illocutionary intention (to request, to order, to encourage). The
separation of the moment of writing the text and that of using it makes it
possible to allocate different kinds of intention to each moment: a locu-
tionary intention to the moment of writing the text, and different illo-
cutionary intentions to the moments of using the previously written text.
The communication process in the case of lawmaking is even more
complex than in Bianchi’s example. Both in Bianchi’s example and in
lawmaking, a number of separate moments are involved, but the
number of actors is greater in lawmaking, numbering at least two: one
person drafts the text and another makes it into a binding legal act.
This division of duties was pointed out by Maley, who identified the
role of the DRAFTSMAN and the SOURCE in lawmaking.26 Maley
regards the legislature, which has sovereign power to make law for a
community, as the SOURCE; meanwhile, the DRAFTSMAN is a
specific member of the legislature, or a representative of the admin-
istration, tasked with the preparation of a draft statute.27 Goffman
makes a similar distinction and differentiates the role of the AUTHOR
(‘[the one] who selects and encodes the message’) and the PRINCIPAL
25 Claudia Bianchi, ‘How to do things with (recorded) words’, in Philosophical Studies 167(2) (2013),
pp. 485–495.
26 Yon Maley, ‘The Language of Legislation’, Language in Society 16(1) (1987), pp. 25–48. Despite
making this distinction between the SOURCE and the DRAFTSMAN, Maley (1987, pp. 31–32) draws
different conclusions from mine. For example, while I attribute the illocutionary intention to the source,
he attributes the communicative intention to it: ‘The SOURCE of the statute is the legislature itself,
whose communicative intention [my emphasis] the words of the statute are deemed to express’, and in
another place: ‘The legislature instructs the DRAFTSMAN as to the substance of the Bill (as it is at this
stage), that is, its intended meaning’.
27 ‘The very concept of a draft is almost entirely restricted to written language’. Michael Stubbs,
‘Can I Have That in Writing? Some Neglected Topics in Speech Act Theory’, Journal of Pragmatics 7
(1983), p. 485.
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(‘[the one] who is committed to the propositions and acts ex-
pressed’).28 A similar distinction is made by Dworkin.29
V. LEGISLATIVE INTENTION AS AN ILLOCUTIONARY INTENTION
The main conclusion to be drawn from the division of duties out-
lined above is that written communication may entail separation of
the locutionary act (writing) from the illocutionary one (using a
previously written text). Locutionary and illocutionary intentions
follow the same pattern of separation. Drafting a statute (the locu-
tionary act) involves locutionary intention, i.e. the intention to
communicate certain words. The DRAFTSMAN (e.g. a ministry
employee) formulates this intention but is not regarded by the leg-
islative procedure as a person competent to perform the illocution-
ary act of lawmaking. Consequently, their illocutionary intention is
irrelevant or non-existent. The illocutionary intention is formulated
by the PRINCIPAL, who acts with the intention of conferring
binding legal effect on a draft legal text. In addition, lawmaking
involves perlocutionary intentions, i.e. intentions to make changes in
the extra-linguistic reality.30 These intentions may be formulated
both by people acting in the capacity of the DRAFTSMAN and the
PRINCIPAL.
In the framework outlined above, the illocutionary intention (the
force-intention, as opposed to the locutionary meaning-intention) is
essential for giving an appropriate normative significance to the act of
enacting the law, which is impossible to achieve by the mere writing
of the text. The illocutionary intention manifests itself only in those
who are appropriately empowered in the procedure of performing an
illocutionary act. The illocutionary intention of the legislature within
28 Stubbs after Erving Goffman, Forms of Talk (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981), p. 492.
29 Dworkin (1986, p. 322) uses an example of a group letter and distinguishes between ‘the author of
that letter who drafts it to attract the most signatures possible’ and ‘someone who signs a group letter
he cannot rewrite for the group’.
30 The concept of perlocution applied in this paper is an extended version of the traditional Austinian
one, which referred to the immediate consequences a speech act causes in the audience’s attitudes and
behaviour (as in the example of opening a window, referred to on p. 88). This traditional, narrow
understanding of perlocutionary effects resulted from a traditional, narrow understanding of a commu-
nication situation as a face-to-face one. If it is to be applied to the written communication by law, which is
addressed to a wide audience and extends far and long beyond the speaker’s immediate context, the
traditional approach to perlocutionary effect must be extended. The perlocutionary effects of a legal
text can be understood as its impact on social groups and society as a whole; moreover, the consequences
in social reality should be understood broadly, not merely in terms of the immediate communication
environment. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this issue.
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the above-described framework corresponds to Joseph Raz’s idea of
minimal, formal legislative intention (‘intention to make law’)31:
A person is legislating (voting for a Bill, etc.) by expressing an intention that the
text of the Bill on which he is voting will—when understood as such texts, when
promulgated in the circumstances in which this one is promulgated, are under-
stood in the legal culture of this country—be law.32
The legislature within this model is not a DRAFTSMAN but a
PRINCIPAL. It does not write the draft; it uses it for its own
purposes. The following example may help to understand how the
illocutionary intention works. One can go to a hairdresser and give
him verbal instructions as to how he should cut one’s hair. This
situation corresponds to verbal face-to-face communication, where
words are uttered with simultaneous locutionary and illocutionary
intentions (as shown, in verbal communication both intentions co-
exist in the act of speech). However, one can also go to a hairdresser
with a picture of one’s favorite celebrity and ‘‘give the instruction’’: ‘I
want to look like this!’ In this case, the person giving the instruction
to the hairdresser uses an artifact (a picture) created most often by
somebody else, and utters a directive the content of which is
specified by the content of the picture. This directive is uttered with
the illocutionary intention to give an order, but the content of the
order is defined by somebody else (the author of the picture) or
something else (the artifact in the form of a picture).
In this paper, I argue that lawmaking is carried out along this
second pattern. To the same extent that the photograph provides
content for a command directed to the hairdresser, a legal text
provides the content for the command of a lawmaker. The illocu-
tionary intention of the legislature is to make this legal text law,33
31 Raz (2009b, p. 329).
32 Raz (2009a, p. 284) (footnotes omitted).
33 Similarly to the modified, extended concept of perlocution discussed in footnote 30, the concepts
of illocutionary act and intention used in this paper differ slightly from the traditional Austinian ones.
The difference derives from the structural difference between face-to-face communication (addressed by
Austin) and the complex, multi-personal communications by law. In the traditional approach, the
illocutionary intention is closely intertwined with the locutionary one, as it involves only one person on
the production side: the speaker. The distinction between the AUTHOR (DRAFTSMAN) and the
PRINCIPAL, a characteristic of communications by law, justifies the separation of locutionary and
illocutionary intentions. This is not to say that the illocutionary intention in communication by law is
completely isolated from the understanding of the legal text. As I will point out in the section on
motives, that understanding very often generates the illocutionary intention and is often a basis for the
perlocutionary expectation of the MPs; however, that understanding cannot be equated with the
traditional, meaning-shaping locutionary intention.
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but the semantic content of this text is not established by the leg-
islature.34 Thus, a form of delegation must take place.
Drawing on MacCallum’s model of legislative intent,35 one can
argue that a delegation of such intent takes place in lawmaking. What
is delegated is the task of forming the locutionary intent (choosing
words to express thoughts), not that of forming the illocutionary or
perlocutionary ones. Delegating this task makes the text a black box:
The legislative decision to enact this text as law is only the choice of
the box and not the choice of the content. The illocutionary intention
resembles the ‘basic intention’, as defined by Lepore and Stone (2015).
The authors highlight the indexical nature of this intention, i.e. the fact
that the role of this intention is to indicate a particular sentence or a
set of sentences as those the speaker wants to commit themselves to.36
The legislative decision to enact a text as law is similar to the
decision of the legislator to appoint a person to a position (a judge,
ombudsman or president). In both cases, the legislator’s expectations
do not determine how the subject of their decision will operate,
because that subject (a person performing a given function or a legal
text) is autonomous. The choice of the person, as the choice of the
text, is rational: It is based on the assessment of their suitability to
serve a particular purpose. In the case of the text, this suitability is
defined by the text’s potential to depict a pattern of behavior the
members of the legislature find useful in combating a wrongdoing
they want to combat.37 Whether this assessment is right or wrong
34 Forguson makes an interesting distinction between two kinds of ambiguity which may arise in the
interpretation of speech acts: a force ambiguity and a locutionary ambiguity. The former is an
uncertainty regarding what illocutionary force a locutionary act has, the latter is an uncertainty
regarding what semantic content a clear illocutionary act conveys. In legal interpretation, the force
ambiguity is very rare and locutionary ambiguity is very common: lawyers rarely wonder whether a
legislative act is an illocutionary act of imposing directives, but very often struggle to identify the real
semantic content of this act. The proposed three-type distinction of legislative intentions helps explain
this phenomenon of legal interpretation. The illocutionary intention of the PRINCIPAL is relatively
clear, the locutionary intention of the DRAFTSMAN is notoriously ambiguous. Forguson (1973, p. 170).
35 Gerald C. MacCallum, Legislative Intent and Other Essays on Law, Politics and Morality (Ma-
dison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993).
36 Ernie Lepore, Matthew Stone, Imagination and Convention (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2015), pp. 209, 219.
37 Some authors (e.g. Ekins 2013, p. 112) suggest that to follow Waldron’s or Raz’s ideas of
‘minimal’ legislative intent is to treat members of the legislature as irrational in their choices, i.e. as
persons who do not respond to reasons but who blindly accept whatever text is submitted to them. My
position is that the decision to choose a particular text as law is a fully rational one, based on both the
assessment of the purpose of the lawmaking process and the features of the draft bill. All those
assessments, however, are non-aggregable motives the individual members of the legislature act upon,
not intentions that can be shared. Therefore, they do not constitute the legislative intent and should not
bear any significance for the interpretation of legal texts.
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does not matter: the suitability of this text is independent of what
legislators think about the text.
If the legislator sets the form, who sets the content? Philosophers
of language have worked out a position whereby the semantic
content of the text does not depend on anyone’s intention or state of
mind but rather on the history of language tools (words, sentences,
etc.) used in that text.38 Those philosophers, representatives of so-
called semantic externalism, advocate the idea that meaning is
shaped in the process of repeatable co-occurrence of words (sen-
tences) and states of affairs: a name co-occurs with a person, a noun
co-occurs with a thing, a predicate co-occurs with a given attribute.
The co-occurrence can be physical (words and things or qualities are
present at the same time and place), or of a historical-causal nature
(as in Kripke-Putnam semantics, in which our current reference ex-
tends back to the first use of the word).
As a result of this co-occurrence, historical chains of usages come
into existence – Millikan calls them ‘lineages’.39 A lineage starts the
moment a word is used in a particular way for the first time. This
moment is called ‘the original baptism’40 or ‘the naming ceremony’.41 At
this moment, the speaker for the first time points to a particular
element of reality (a state of affairs, a quality) and uses the word to
refer to this element of reality. Subsequent usages of this word are
anchored in this first moment. The users of language borrow the
reference from the previous uses of the language. By doing so, the
users take part in the chain of usages and thereby in the tradition of
this word’s use.
38 For instance, Millikan observes that the words and sentences we use have a relatively stable public
meaning, arising from the historically conditioned and social nature of language (Ruth Garrett Millikan,
Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories [Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984]). This meaning is
autonomous of the intentions and states of mind of the individual language user (Ruth Garrett Millikan,
Varieties of Meaning: The 2002 Jean Nicod Lectures [Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004], p. 127) and can
evolve (Ruth Garrett Millikan, Language. A Biological Model [Oxford: Clarendon Press Oxford, 2005],
p. 61. A similar position on autonomous linguistic meaning is presented by Waldron (Jeremy Waldron,
Law and Disagreement, [Oxford, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1999], pp. 128–129) and Schauer (1993), albeit
with no reference to a particular philosophy of language. According to Schauer, meaning is independent
from states of mind of language users and consists in ‘the ability of symbols – words, phrases, sentences
– to carry meaning independent of the communicative goals on particular occasions of the users of
those symbols’ (Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules. A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based
Decision-Making in Law and in Life [Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993], p. 55).
39 Millikan: ‘The phenomenon of public language emerges, I believe, not as a set of abstract objects,
but as a real sort of stuff in the real world, neither abstract nor arbitrarily constructed by the theorist. It
consists of actual utterances and scripts, forming crisscrossing lineages’ see Millikan (2005, p. 38).
40 Kripke (1980).
41 Devitt (1980).
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The chain of co-occurrences (which constitute what we call a
linguistic practice) leads a so-called ‘stabilizing function’ of signs to
emerge.42 The stabilizing function means that irrespective of a par-
ticular user’s intention, a word refers to a state of affairs to which it
systematically referred in the past. What defines the reference is the
link between the word and the state of affairs typical of it; the link
has been constituted by a critical mass of cases in which users re-
ferred by this word to that state of affairs. In this way, a public
language emerges, consisting of the history of usages and a relatively
stable semantic link between the words and reality that constitutes
meaning. Individual intentions are far from central to this process.43
A similar, anti-intentionalist position has been recently embraced
by Lepore and Stone (2015) who questioned the traditional, Gricean
view of intentions as key factors in determining meaning. The au-
thors promote a ‘direct intentionalism’ within which the only
function of the interlocutors’ intentions is to indicate the tradition-
ally developed linguistic convention they want to use, not to con-
stitute meaning.44 In their approach, as in Millikan’s, language is a
public tool in which historically established conventions rather than
particular users’ intentions define what words and sentences refer to.
In some sense, the lawmaker’s decision to make ‘this’ text a law is an
instance of ‘direct intentionalism’: It is an indication of the conven-
tion the lawmaker wants to use in the particular instance of com-
munication. Lepore and Stone explicitly indicate that the intentions
within the framework of direct intentionalism may indicate a whole
discourse (e.g. a text) as the utterance a speaker wants to commit
themselves to.45 Similarly, the illocutionary intention of a lawmaker
discussed in this paper indicates legal text as a set of utterances to
which that lawmaker wants to commit him- or herself.
The combination of an illocutionary account of legislative
intention and an account of a conventional public language consti-
tute a promising theoretical project. Within this project, the legis-
42 Millikan (1984).
43 A more detailed discussion of the significance of semantic externalism’s anti-intentional stance for
legal theory in general, and the theory of legal interpretation in particular, can be found in Marcin
Matczak, ‘A Theory that Beats the Theory? Lineages, the Growth of Signs, and Dynamic Legal
Interpretation’, (forthcoming) Maciej Witek and Iwona Witczak-Plisiecka (Eds.), Dynamics and Vari-
eties of Speech Actions, a theme issue of Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the
Humanities, Brill.
44 Lepore and Stone (2015).
45 Lepore and Stone (2015, p. 209).
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lature’s role is to confer a binding force upon a legal text understood
as a set of linguistic expressions with a historically developed con-
ventional public meaning. The binding force is conferred by the
illocutionary intention of the lawmaker, which intention has a
blanket nature, i.e. the conventional (historically developed) mean-
ing of expressions used in a legal text provides the semantic content.
As a consequence, words and sentences included in a particular text
may, but do not have to, correlate with the locutionary intention of
the author of that text. In the case of a legal text, its public, con-
ventional meaning does not have to correlate with the private
semantic understanding of legislator (PRINCIPAL) who approves a
text and gives it the illocutionary force of law. The authority of the
legislator consists in the right to accept certain words and configu-
rations of those words, make them law, and thereby establish them
as the object of future legal interpretation. By accepting those words
and configurations, the legislator accepts their historically developed
conventional meanings.
Contrary to Ekins,46 I argue the interpreters should treat text as a
freestanding object. Ekins argues otherwise because he believes the
authority of an artifact (like a watch or a gauge) must be derived
from the authority of its creator. He does not acknowledge, how-
ever, that an artifact has been designed for a particular purpose
exactly because it is better than its author in achieving this purpose
(a watch is better in measuring the time than the watchmaker). By
the same token, a text is used in lawmaking because there are many
roles and functions lawmakers cannot fulfill, but texts can. One such
function is an ability to govern people’s behavior in places where the
lawmakers are not present and at times that extend beyond the lives
of the lawmakers.
The argument that legislative intent is illocutionary in nature can
also be derived from the tradition of legal interpretation. According
to its canonical principles, the interpreter may disregard both the
locutionary intention with which the legal text was developed and
the perlocutionary intention of the lawmaker. Disregarding the
locutionary intention takes place when one of the principles of the
conflict of law is applied (e.g. ‘lex specialis derogat legi generali’). In
this case, it is necessary to question whether the author of the text
46 Ekins (2013, p. 96).
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wished to say what he said. Improving the quality or coherence of a
legal text by the interpreter, permitted under the principles of
interpretation, demonstrates that the locutionary intention is not
absolutely binding.
The perlocutionary intention is not absolutely binding on the
interpreter either. The interpreter is not obliged to take into con-
sideration the expectations of individual members of the legislature
as to the anticipated effects of implementing the law. In this case,
too, it is possible to disregard the perlocutionary intentions of the
legislature.
The only intention which the interpreter cannot disregard is the
illocutionary intention. The interpreter cannot simply assume that a
legal text made legally binding is not law, and she cannot freely
choose another text as a subject of her interpretation. This very fact
makes the illocutionary intention essential for the interpretation
process and underlines its primacy over the locutionary and per-
locutionary ones.
In conclusion, the legislative intent is illocutionary in nature. This
insight constitutes a departure from previous approaches that have
focused on the semantic (locutionary) intention. The reader accus-
tomed to those previous approaches may wonder whether the
locutionary intentions of the PRINCIPAL are of any relevance to
lawmaking. This is the topic to which I will turn in the next section.
VI. INTENTIONS VS. MOTIVES
Members of the legislature obviously have some convictions as to
the meaning of the legal text they are voting on. The question is
what role those convictions play in the complex speech act of law-
making. In particular, we need to decide if those convictions should
be equated with the locutionary intention of the members of legis-
lature acting as a PRINCIPAL- as it has been to date- or if it plays
another role.
To answer this question, we need to distinguish between inten-
tions and motives in speech acts. As each speech act is an action,
there are usually some states of affairs which encourage or dis-
courage performing it. These may vary. Because I need money, I ask
someone for a loan, and I promise to return the money loaned (I
perform a speech act of promising). Because I find it a bit chilly, I
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order a person standing by the window to close it (I perform a
speech act of ordering). Both the lack of money and the need to have
it, and the sensation of feeling chilly, certainly contribute to my
performing appropriate speech acts. However, none of these reasons
is a constitutive element of the speech act itself, nor do they in any
way affect the acts’ success or failure. Intentions work differently.
The existence and nature of each of the three intentions are relevant
to the structure of a speech act and its validity (as shown in the
previous examples of exchanging wedding vows). Thus, there is an
important difference in kind between the reasons for performing a
speech act and the three intentions formulated in the speech act.47 If
we regard lawmaking as a speech act, then what is essential for its
structure are the three intentions corresponding to the three aspects
of that act- not the reasons for performing it (henceforth motives),
which are external with respect to that act.
In the process of legislating there are many motives leading a
member of the legislature to make a decision to vote in favor of a
legal text. Such motives include loyalty towards members of his
party and pressure applied by lobbyists.48 These motives, however,
are irrelevant for the speech act structure because, unlike the three
kinds of intentions, they are not essential for the occurrence of a
speech act, or they are formulated by persons who cannot perform
this speech act (as pointed out by Ekins49).
In light of the above distinction, a crucial question is to decide
whether the understanding of the draft by the PRINCIPAL consti-
tutes an intention or a motive within the legislative speech act.
Those who take part in parliamentary work know very well that
many members of the legislature vote on a bill without being
familiar with it. These parliamentarians’ manner of voting follows
that of their party leaders and is based on their guidance and trust in
their authority. The fact that their illocutionary act (consisting of
acknowledging a text as law) is nevertheless valid means that
familiarity with a legal text or the manner in which it is understood
by the members of the legislature is not essential for legislating.
47 This is acknowledged by Ekins (2013, pp. 26–27), who claims that ‘Neither the hope, nor the
expectation takes the place of my intention in explaining my action. My hopes and expectations are
states of mind that I may hold about my action; they are not the state that explains how and for what I
act, which is my intention’.
48 Dworkin (1986, p. 318).
49 Ekins (2013, p. 21).
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Because the validity of the act does not rely on the PRINCIPAL’s
understanding of the text, we can conclude that their understanding
is not an intention, but a motive. Hence, the focus of previous
authors on locutionary or semantic intentions was misguided: The
PRINCIPAL’s understanding of the draft is not a crucial factor
influencing the act of lawmaking.50
The relatively inferior role the PRINCIPAL’s understanding of the
draft plays in lawmaking can be illustrated by way of a thought
experiment. Let us imagine that a parliament enacts as law the Ten
Commandments, which, according to the Book of Exodus, were
authored by God. Would the parliamentarians express the locu-
tionary intention to say the words of the Ten Commandments by
voting on them? Or would they rather regard their content as worth
supporting, based on their own (possibly imperfect) understanding of
them? Next, would their interpretation be different from the his-
torical, theological interpretation only because the Ten Command-
ments have been enacted as law in a positivistic sense? Should the
interpreter understand the Ten Commandments the way parlia-
mentarians understood them at the time of their enactment? It seems
that the interpretation of the Ten Commandments as law should be
based on a historical understanding, i.e. independently from their
possible individual readings by the parliamentarians. The way the
parliamentarians understood the Ten Commandments may
encourage them to vote in favor of their becoming law, but this
understanding is only one of many possible motives on which they
can act. In other words, enacting the Ten Commandments as law
does not change their semantic content, and the locutionary inten-
tion of the parliamentarians does not play any constitutive role in
that enactment.
If one perceives the parliamentarians’ understanding of legal texts
as motives for action, not as intentions, one can see that the role of
50 Ekins’ proposal (2013) to understand legislative intent in terms of reasons is, in my view, an
attempt to define legislative intent in terms of motives (in Bentham’s meaning see footnote 52).
Understood at an individual level, reasons to legislate may consist of an individual legislator’s under-
standing of a wrongdoing the proposed legislation is to combat and an understanding of a cause-effect
chain that will lead to combating that wrongdoing. At some point, Ekins (2013, pp. 135–139) seems to
understand reasons at a more general, non-individual level, namely as a set of unified, objective causes
that led the legislature to legislate. Such general reasons are odd phenomena: if they are not aggregated
individual reasons of the members of the legislature, they must be some kind of universalia, Platonic
entities or the interpreter’s conjectures as to what made the legislature enact a particular text as law.
Contrary to Ekins, I believe that reasons, as motives, are by definition individual: They must be
allocable to particular legislators who were stimulated to action by them.
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the legislature does not differ much from the role of the addressee of
a legal text.51 Both the legislature and the addressee understand in
some way a legal text written by someone else. The difference is that
the legislature has the power to make this text a source of law and it
may, to that end, demand its modification (by submitting an
amendment). By contrast, the addressee of the legal text cannot
change or replace it.
The role motives play as incentives for action was discussed by
Bentham, who distinguished external (real) and internal (mental)
motives as well as motives ‘in esse’ and motives ‘in prospect’.52
According to Bentham’s classification, the understanding of the draft
text by the parliamentarians seems to be an internal motive ‘in esse’
or an internal motive ‘in prospect’, i.e. a state of mind concerning the
draft bill or a state of mind concerning the future understanding and
application of the draft bill after it becomes law, both of which lead
the parliamentarians to vote.53
VII. REASONS FOR CONFLATION IN DISCUSSIONS ON LEGISLATIVE
INTENT TO DATE
As has been shown in the preceding sections, the lawmaking process
consists of the separation of the roles between different subjects.
This process rather resembles that of building a house – you need an
architect to design the house, an investor who wants to implement
the design, and the contractor who builds the house. These roles are
not performed by one person because they entail a very complex
51 According to Dworkin (1986, p. 322), an ordinary legislator ‘occupies a position intermediate
between speaker and hearer. He must decide what thought the words on the paper before him are
likely to be taken to express’.
52 See Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislations (Oxford:
Clarendon Press Oxford, 1879), pp. 99–100, especially his fire example: ‘A fire breaks out in your
neighbour’s house: you are under apprehension of its extending to your own: you are apprehensive,
that if you stay in it, you will be burnt: you accordingly run out of it. This then is the act: the others are
all motives to it. The event of the fire’s breaking out in your neighbour’s house is an external motive,
and that in esse: the idea or belief of the probability of the fire’s extending to your own house, that of
your being burnt if you continue, and the pain you feel at the thought of such a catastrophe, are all so
many internal events, but still in esse: the event of the fire’s actually extending to your own house, and
that of your being actually burnt by it, external motives in prospect: the pain you would feel at seeing
your house a burning, and the pain you would feel while you yourself were burning, internal motives in
prospect: which events, according as the matter turns out, may come to be in esse: but then of course
they will cease to act as motives’ (Bentham 1879, p. 100).
53 As Waldron points out: ‘A legislator who votes for (or against) a provision like ‘No vehicle shall
be permitted to enter any municipal park’ does so on the assumption that – to put it crudely – what the
words mean to him is identical to what they will mean to those to whom they are addressed (in the
event that the provision is passed)’ (Waldron 1999, p. 129).
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structure of behaviours, interactions, checks and balances, all
requiring different competences and skills. The construction of a
house is based on the key document – the architect’s blueprint. This
blueprint constitutes a tangible element which enables the exter-
nalization of thought, the co-ordination of actions and the focusing
of the deliberations. If doubts or ambiguities arise during any of
these processes, the blueprint can always be referred to. In law-
making, a similar function is performed by the draft of a legal text.
According to Waldron,54 the positing of a formulated draft as ‘the
resolution under discussion’ provides a focus for ordering the par-
ticipants’ deliberations at every stage of the legislative procedure.
The traditional understanding of the legislative process fails to
take account of its multi-person complexity. For example, Ekins55
believes we should perceive legislation as structurally similar to an
action by a single person – a ‘prince-legislator’. This simplified ap-
proach is prevalent in contemporary legal philosophy, and its con-
sequence is a simplified perception of legislative intention. Authors
who adopt this approach by default regard legislative intention as the
communicative intention of a single speaker, i.e. in principle as a
locutionary intention.56
Paul Grice bears some responsibility for such a homogeneous
perception of legislative intentions as locutionary in nature. His
seminal works on the philosophy of language57 provide a point of
reference for many philosophers of law in their analyses of legislative
intention. Grice can be both credited and blamed for lawyers’ con-
centrating on the speaker’s meaning and for viewing the legislator’s
intention as a communicative intention. The only modification that
philosophers of law introduced into Grice’s deliberations was a
departure from the individual intention in favor of a collective
intention58; however, the structure of the legislative intention (as a
simple communicative intention) remained unchanged. The almost
universal trust in Grice’s ideas finds its reflection in the numerous
54 Waldron (1999, p. 82).
55 Ekins (2013, pp. 127–128).
56 John F. Manning, ‘Textualism and Legislative Intent’, Virginia Law Review 91(419) (2005), p. 423:
‘In important respects, intentionalists believe that a legislative command can and should be treated as
one would treat the speech of an individual human actor’.
57 Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).
58 See Dworkin (1986), p. 64.
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works by authors dealing with legislative intentions and their impact
on legal interpretation.59
The Gricean way of thinking manifests itself in the works of legal
philosophers through the following assumptions:
(a) the legislator is a speaker and the addressee of laws is a listener,
(b) identifying the legislator’s semantic intention plays a crucial role in
legal interpretation
The basic limitation of the Gricean approach to communicative
intention is that it is only adequate for the analysis of face-to-face
communication, i.e. synchronic (occurring in one place and time)
and involving only one speaker. For lawmaking, which is stretched
out over time (diachronic) and involves many participants, Grice’s
perspective is too limited. In addition, Grice’s analyses pertained to
spoken language,60 while the processes and outcomes of contem-
porary lawmaking are predominantly written. As demonstrated
above, the written character of this process reveals the complexity of
legislative intentions.
Drawing on Grice, current deliberations on legislative intention
focus on its locutionary (semantic) aspect. This usually leads to
conflation of the locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary as-
pects of legislative intent. Examples of the conflation can be found in
Ekins (‘intentions to convey a certain meaning’,61 ‘intention to leg-
islate’,62 ‘the ends it [an institution] intended to pursue’63), Gardner
(‘intentions concerning its [legislation’s] meaning, application, use
and effect’64), Manning (‘the legislature’s intended meaning’,65 Raz’s
minimal intention,66 ‘policy intentions’67).
Some authors nonetheless manage to discern the illocutionary
and perlocutionary aspects of such intention despite the restricted
Gricean framework. For example, Marmor perceives the legislative
59 See, for instance, Marmor (2014), Solum (2008) and Ekins (2013).
60 Grice (1991) uses some examples of written language in his works (e.g. the sign ‘Keep off the
grass’) but draws no conclusions as to the need for a different approach to spoken and written language
in his analysis.
61 Ekins (2013, p. 14).
62 Ekins (2013, p. 8).
63 Ekins (2013, p. 1).
64 John Gardner, Law as a Leap of Faith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 60.
65 Manning (2005, p. 423).
66 Raz (2009a, p. 287).
67 Raz (2009b, p. 424).
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intention as a communicative one (‘A hearer who wants to grasp
what the speaker says aims to grasp what the speaker intended to
communicate; legal speech cannot be a kind of striking exception’).68
Subsequently, however, he acknowledges another aspect of the
legislative intention: ‘If you vote in favor of a proposed decision yet
fail to realize that you communicate the intention to have the
decision approved institutionally, you simply do not know what you
are doing’.69 The expression ‘intention to have the decision approved
institutionally’ indicates that Marmor is acknowledging the illocu-
tionary aspect of the legislative intention (a wish to give legal effect
to a text).
Other authors perceive legislative intention as exclusively illocu-
tionary in nature. Raz’s concept of the ‘minimal intention’ and
Waldron’s idea of legislative intent70 exemplify this approach. Sim-
ilarly, Shepsle’s approach to legislative intention seems illocutionary
(‘she [legislator] is asserting that she ‘prefers’ the state of the world
that obtains if the motion passes to the one obtaining if it fails’).71
The discussion on the legislative intention would be more orderly
if the deliberations considered its triple nature. Apart from adding
precision to the debate, the consideration of the triple nature of the
legislative intention permits a new outlook on some important is-
sues, for instance, the issue of so-called ‘collective intention’. I devote
the last part of my paper to this problem.
VIII. THREE KINDS OF INTENTION AND THE SO-CALLED COLLECTIVE
INTENTION
Much discussion on the legislative intention revolves around the
question of whether the legislature, as a collective subject, can for-
mulate an intention. The question has been answered in both the
affirmative72 and the negative.73 However, it can be answered to the
68 Marmor (2014. p. 116).
69 Marmor (2014, p. 18).
70 It is somehow surprising that Waldron (1999) in his considerations on legislative intent draws on
Grice as well. Ekins (2013) indicates that Waldron’s numerous references to Grice are inconsistent with
his final conclusion regarding the significance of sentence meaning to legal interpretation. The Gricean
framework is exactly the one Waldron should avoid in building a theory of intentionless legislation, as
Waldron’s approach is more in line with anti-Griceans like Millikan (1984) or Lepore and Stone (2015).
71 Shepsle (1992, p. 248).
72 See Solan (2005), Ekins (2013).
73 See Dworkin (1986), Waldron (1999), Shepsle (1992).
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satisfaction of all participants by recognizing the three types of
intention described in the previous sections of this paper. To specify,
the locutionary and perlocutionary intentions of individual members
of the legislature are indeed varied and cannot be unified to be
considered shared intentions. However, each individual member of
the legislature who votes in favor of a bill acts with the same illo-
cutionary intention. Consequently, the legislature, as a collective
subject, can be regarded as acting with a shared intention, i.e. the
intention to make a text law.74 Let us take a closer look at how
different kinds of intentions involved in lawmaking can or cannot be
aggregated.
Aggregating the locutionary intentions of individuals involved in
the preparation of a legal act is extremely difficult as those intentions
vary widely: Both the draftsmen and the members of the legislature
may understand the text of the draft in many different ways. Even if
this obstacle is overcome, the locutionary intentions of the drafts-
men are irrelevant to the validity of the act of lawmaking. As we
have seen, the author or authors of the text of a bill are not people
who can validly perform the lawmaking act. Because their intention
is irrelevant to the validity of the lawmaking act, the aggregation of
their intentions is also irrelevant. An analogous argument can be
used against the thesis that the different ways individual members of
the legislature (PRINCIPAL) understand the draft text can be
aggregated. Even if they could, being a motive, not an intention,
understanding is irrelevant to the validity of the lawmaking act, and
so is their aggregation.
Similarly, the perlocutionary intentions are very diverse and difficult to
identify, as the individuals involved in lawmaking differ as to their
expectations regarding the effects of the operation of a given law on reality;
moreover, some of those expectations are hidden, for instance those
resulting from a lobbyist’s pressure. Therefore, the perlocutionary inten-
tion cannot constitute a collective intention, and by extension it is
immaterial to the process of the application of a given law in the future.
74 In this section, my discussion of the shared intention is based on the assumption that one cannot
aggregate the intentions of dissenters with those of assenters. The reason is that the aggregation of
intentions is only possible with regard to the same intentions. Nevertheless, one can still claim that the
legislature as a collective agent acts with a shared intention, which is the intention shared by the
majority of its members. After all, the only accepted mechanism to allocate intention to the collective
agent is the majoritarian one, within which the minority intention is dismissed.
THREE KINDS OF INTENTION IN LAWMAKING
The only uniform intention involved in the legislative process is
the illocutionary intention. This intention is homogeneous in the
sense that it is the same for each person voting in favor of making
the text legally binding. This is a formal, minimal intention. On
account of its uniformity, the illocutionary intention is subject to
aggregation. Therefore, we can state that the legislature as a col-
lective subject operates with a uniform and common illocutionary
intention, i.e. the intention to enact a law.
The conviction that the intention of individual members of the
legislature can be aggregated is a cornerstone of the majority model
of legislative intent.75 Many authors have argued against this mod-
el.76 Their criticism consists generally of two claims: firstly, that it is
unclear whose intentions to take into consideration in the aggrega-
tion and, secondly, that one cannot tally intentions that diverge
widely or may even be contradictory.
The first claim may be correct with regard to locutionary and
perlocutionary intentions but does not apply to illocutionary inten-
tion. Although many actors in the legislative process have locu-
tionary and perlocutionary intentions, the (illocutionary) intention to
enact a rule can be attributed only to the members of the legislature
(PRINCIPAL) and only to those of them who vote in favour of the
bill. This is in line with what Dworkin,77 Marmor,78 and MacCal-
lum79 proposed. Thus, the case of illocutionary intention negates the
critics’ claim that it is unclear whose intentions to aggregate.
The second claim – that one cannot tally intentions that diverge
widely – also applies exclusively to locutionary and perlocutionary
intentions. Authors like Moore80 claimed it is impossible to aggre-
gate the various semantic intentions legislative actors can have
regarding the application of a word used in a bill. Within the
framework of the three intentions model, Moore’s claim effectively
75 See Marmor (1992).
76 As Hurd (1990, p. 971) mentions: ‘Theorists engaged in the construction and defense of this model
make ontological commitments only to intentions possessed by individual legislators, but they seek to
analyze the legislature’s intent as a summation of the intentions shared by a majority of its members.
According to this account of legislative intent, one need not postulate the existence of a group mind;
one need only add up the individual intentions which motivated legislators to vote as they did in order
to discover the legislative intent behind a statute’.
77 Dworkin (1986, p. 320).
78 Marmor (1992, p. 163).
79 MacCallum (1993, pp. 17–18).
80 See Moore (1985).
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states that it is impossible to aggregate the locutionary intentions of
legislative actors. Other authors, like Hurd,81 claim it is impossible to
aggregate the expectations regarding the consequences of enacting a
bill. Here we are dealing with perlocutionary intentions. Both critical
approaches are correct when applied to locutionary and perlocu-
tionary intentions respectively, because of the potential divergences
within each. However, neither criticism applies to illocutionary
intention, which, as we have seen, is unified and therefore can be
aggregated.
IX. CONCLUSION
The recurring theme of this paper has been that lawmaking is a
complex illocutionary process involving a combination of three
intentions. The main conclusion to be drawn is that the leading role
in this combination should be assigned to the illocutionary intention,
not to the locutionary (semantic) one, as has been assumed to date.
To begin with, we have seen that the locutionary intention of the
DRAFTSMAN (the official who wrote the bill) does not determine
the manner of understanding the content of a legal act, because this
intention has no binding force. Secondly, the PRINCIPAL (the leg-
islature), whose locutionary intention was thought to bind the
recipient of the law, actually acts with an illocutionary intention.
Thirdly, the way individual parliamentarians acting as the PRINCI-
PAL understand the text is a motive, not an intention: as such it is
non-constitutive of the act of lawmaking. Ultimately, the significance
of the illocutionary intention results from its being the only intention
subject to aggregation, because it is the same in the case of all the
parliamentarians voting in favor of a legal act. The locutionary (se-
mantic) and perlocutionary intentions cannot be aggregated because
they are too diversified.
The acknowledgement of the leading role of illocutionary inten-
tion in lawmaking can also have some positive effects for jurispru-
dence from an interdisciplinary perspective. The latest works on
legislative intent within legal philosophy82 do not acknowledge the
illocutionary character of legislative intent; they also criticize Raz’s,
Waldron’s and Shepsle’s approaches. The result is a widening dis-
81 Hurd (1990, p. 945).
82 e.g. Ekins (2013).
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crepancy between the public choice theory approach (represented
e.g. by Shepsle) and legal philosophers’ approach to legislative intent.
Shifting the focus of legal philosophy from semantic intentions to
illocutionary ones would align it with the political science approach
to lawmaking and thereby have an integrating effect on the two
disciplines.
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